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Chapter 1: Introduction 
Background 
Losses from disasters can devastate communities and nations. Natural and human—caused 
disasters worldwide have resulted in financial losses that have risen steadily from 1980 to 2009. 
The decadal annual average losses from the 1980's were approximately $20 billion, increasing to 
$80 billion in the 1990's and $110 billion by the 2000's (Council 2011).  Disaster losses in the U.S. 
are reflecting a similar trend and have been increasing exponentially since 1960 (Cutter and 
Emrich 2005). 
In the decade 2000—2009, natural disasters in the United States caused over $350 billion in 
economic losses (Re. 2009). Some hazards, such as earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, droughts, 
landslides and volcanic hazards, can affect communities well beyond those directly impacted by 
the event. Due to the increasingly interconnectedness of local and national communities, 
broader regions are vulnerable to the effects of natural disasters (Council 2011).  
Hazard Resilience and Mitigation 
A myriad of potential disasters put communities at risk. Natural and human—caused disasters 
result in public health emergencies, suffering loss of life, damage to economies, and damage to 
community environments. Hazard resilience is the capacity of community systems to adapt to 
these stressors and continue, or quickly recover normal functions following a disaster (Council 
2011). Issues surrounding community resilience are prompting practitioners to question the 
existing networks established to implement hazard mitigation. Ultimately, a community’s 
approach to hazard mitigation can influence overall resilience (Council 2011). 
According to FEMA, hazard mitigation “is any sustained action to reduce or eliminate the long-
term risk to human life and property from hazards”(FEMA 2008). Hazard mitigation can be 
implemented prior, during and/or after an incident; but may be most effective when 
implemented in comprehensive long—term planning mechanisms before a disaster occurs 
(FEMA 2008). In 2000, Congress passed the Disaster Mitigation Act (DMA2K) that established 
new requirements for coordination in hazard planning between local, state, and tribal 
governments.  The passage of this act also allocates federal grant funding for state and local 
governments that develop hazard mitigation plans (HMP) (FEMA 2000). The implementation of 
mitigation and preparedness strategies has the potential to alleviate the effects of many natural 
threats, and since the passage of the DMA2K, the importance placed on mitigation has 
increased (Beller-Simms 2004).  
Role of Collaboration in Mitigation 
According to FEMA mitigation planning resources, the HMP serves to benefit the community 
most when the steering committee is representative of the whole community, including State 
and Local Government, private companies, non—profit agencies, and educational institutions, 
etc. (FEMA 2002). Collaboration is recognized as an approach to solving complex problems in 
which a diverse group of stakeholders, i.e. steering committee, deliberate to build consensus 
and translate consensus into results (Margerum 2011). It is the responsibility of the steering 
committee to engage in a deliberative process to fully understand the risks and vulnerabilities 
of the community, engage the general public to ensure that hazard mitigation approaches are 
accepted by the broader community and ultimately reach consensus about hazard mitigation 
goals, objectives, and a hazard initiative implementation strategy.  
The complexity of hazard planning warrants a collaborative environment as there is the need to 
share decision making power and guide resource allocation of mitigation projects. The necessity 
of collaboration illustrates the changing nature of public policy and planning approaches today 
and suggests how hazard mitigation can be accomplished (Margerum 2011, Council 2011).  
Issue Surrounding Resilience-Focused Collaboration 
Despite the adoption of the local HMPs, and the intended collaborative nature of plan 
development, individuals and organizations often fail to perceive that hazards may pose 
unacceptable risk to their communities and ways of life, and do not accept their role in reducing 
that risk (Council 2011). These circumstances can result in the failure of communities to engage 
all necessary parties, and can ultimately affect the quality of the plan as well as the effectiveness 
of hazard implementation strategies—this is the case in hazard planning across the country.  
Both the public and private sectors play a role in hazard management. The public sector, 
including the local government, provides many services that strengthen resilience and manage 
the day—to—day functions of the community. The public sector allocates staff for emergency 
and hazard planning, manages stormwater systems so as to reduce flooding impacts, and 
regulates the seismic safety of facilities through building and development standards, etc.. The 
private sector, on the other hand, maintains many other services that are essential to the 
community well—being, including water services, power and communication distribution and 
medical care.  
However, the failure to recognize roles and responsibilities of hazard management is embodied 
by the limited engagement of the private sector in hazard mitigation planning (Council 2011). 
These circumstances lead to question the extent of collaboration with any entities beyond the 
public sector, including quasi—governmental and not—for—profits.  
Purpose 
The hazard planning literature recognizes that cross sector collaborative planning can positively 
influence the hazard resilience of a community; however, MacManus and Caruson suggest 
there has been little cross—sector hazard planning research at the local level (MacManus and 
Caruson 2011). In light of the minimal local—level research analyzing cross—sector 
involvement in collaborative hazards planning, I propose to develop a general synthesis of 
resilience—focused cross—sector collaboration in FEMA Region X counties.  
Project Overview 
This study will examine the extent to which local actors collaborate with public, quasi—
public/not—for—profit and private sectors, and evaluate the quality of that collaboration. Then 
the study will identify limiting factors of collaborative planning and offer strategies associated 
with sustaining resilience—focused cross sector collaboration throughout counties.  
I perform this analysis, by sampling and analyzing the responses to a cross—sectional survey 
distributed to 17 counties across FEMA Region X: Alaska, Idaho, Oregon and Washington. To 
supplement the survey responses, I conducted case—study interviews with three of the 
counties included in the survey sample.  
Chapter 4: Results, discusses how the county case—interviews can be applied to the general 
results captured by the steering committee survey, and any implications as they relate to each 
survey question. I also provide suggestions for improving ongoing resilience-focused 
collaborative implementation efforts based on my findings, and present ideas for further 
research on this, and similar topics.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
In this section I review the available literature that discusses issues relevant to resilience—
focused cross—sector collaboration. Some of the collaborative literature was specific to the topic 
of hazard resilience; however, some resources can be indirectly applied to the area of research.  
Re-Shaping Hazard Mitigation Planning 
Post—disaster analysis of large scale events such as 9/11 and the uncoordinated hazard 
management of local, state and federal agencies during Hurricane Katrina enhanced the debate 
about how to re—shape systems of mitigation and preparedness to increase management 
capacity for hazardous incidents. This debate produced consensus about the need to strengthen 
local, cross—sector collaboration and depart from the traditional command—and—control 
approach typical of disaster management (MacManus and Caruson 2011).  
Resilience—focused cross—sector collaboration shares responsibility and decision making 
authority across community stakeholders, which can foster increasingly effective disaster 
management (Waugh and Streib 2006).  This approach interacts effectively with the broader 
disaster relief community, by the engaging the public government sector, non—profit and 
private sectors in mitigation planning (MacManus and Caruson 2011, Waugh and Streib 2006). 
The critical role of local resources in hazard preparedness, and the local capabilities of 
mitigation are strengthened and reinforced by engaging in cross—sector collaboration (Schafer 
2008).  
Bryson, Crosby and Stone argue that cross—sector collaboration is a necessity of public 
decision—making because we live in a shared—power world in which many groups and 
organizations are involved in, affected by, or have some partial responsibility to act on public 
challenges (Bryson, Crosby and Stone 2006). No one organization or institution has the 
legitimacy, power, authority, or intelligence to act alone on important public issues, such as 
those present in hazard mitigation planning. These collaborative arrangements emerge when 
key public and private sector actors recognize that individual and community goals cannot be 
achieved alone (Council 2011). The public and private sectors each have resources, capabilities, 
and access to different parts of the community; thus cross—sector collaboration may improve 
the ability of a community to mitigate hazards.  
Complexity of Hazard Mitigation  
Collaborative approaches are invariably needed to address complex problems, such as those 
associated with hazard planning (Council 2011). Disaster losses are the result of interactions 
between three major systems: the physical environment, which includes hazardous events; the 
social and demographic characteristics of the communities that experience them; and the 
buildings, roads, bridges, and other components of the constructed environment (Mileti 1999). 
Disaster losses are growing because these systems, and their interactions, are becoming more 
complex and increasingly challenging to mitigate.  
Challenges of Initiating and Sustaining Resilience-Focused 
Collaboration 
Even though there is growing awareness of community disaster resilience and cross—sector 
collaboration, resilience collaborative communities tend to be an exception rather than a rule. 
Cross—sector collaboration to enhance resilience can be extremely effective when efforts are 
tied to higher levels of government for additional support and expertise; however, a political 
and social environment truly supportive of community based resilience—focused cross—sector 
collaboration does not exist at the national level. The National Research Council suggests that 
communities are left independently to determine how to move forward, what works, and what 
does not, in terms of resilience—focused collaboration (Council 2011). This ad—hoc trial and 
error process can overwhelm community capacity and lead to disinterest.  
The lack of higher—level guidance can often result in wide variability of preparedness across 
communities. Some of the limiting factors that may impede successful cross—sector 
collaboration are described here. 
Risk Perception  
Risk perception is measured in a variety of ways: as the perceived likelihood of a particular 
event, such as an earthquake; as expectations about the severity of its impacts on the 
community; and as expectations about the personal threat posed by the hazard (Tierney, Lindell 
and Perry 2001). Perception is the basis of action, and inaccurate perceptions stand in the way of 
action to promote community disaster resilience through collaboration (Council 2011).  
Risk Uncertainty 
Communities are often aware of hazards that can impact their community, but understanding 
the risk is conceptually difficult and subject to biases. In particular, society has great difficulty 
in understanding and acting on information related to low—probability—high—consequence 
events (Council 2011).Such that communities may base their expectations of future events on 
historical occurrences (Council 2011). An example of this bias occurred during Hurricane 
Katrina, where some residents chose not to evacuate their homes in spite of a mandatory 
evacuation, because of less—severe events in the past. Risk uncertainty may emerge as a greater 
barrier when a community experiences natural disasters infrequently 
Personalizing Risk 
Communities are often aware of hazards that can impact them, but fail to personalize the risk 
(Tierney et al. 2001, Council 2011). It is a common misconception that hazards can happen, but 
not in my community, nor during my lifetime. The capacity to recognize that hazards can affect 
an individual personally influences risk perception, whether it is in direct damage to a home, 
personal injury, or economic hardship.   
Personalizing risk appears to be an important link between acknowledging a hazard and taking 
self—protective action (Tierney et al. 2001). In cases where individuals are unable to personalize 
risk, they may not consider it their responsibility to reduce that risk or participate in such efforts 
(Council 2011). 
Prior Disaster Experience 
Personal disaster experience is the main influencing factor in determining risk perception, and 
how preparedness activities are undertaken. Prior experience engenders higher levels of 
preparedness, largely because experience leads to greater awareness of disaster impacts and the 
demands that the events can generate (Tierney et al. 2001). Individuals and communities that 
have experienced disaster situations are more likely to ensure the necessary mitigation tasks 
and activities are carried out more effectively (Tierney et al. 2001).  
Diverging Interests 
Interests of public, quasi—public/not—for—profit and private sector collaborators often 
diverge, and this impedes the maturation of trusted collaborative relationships. An example of 
divergent interests occurs between floodplain management and residential developers, i.e. 
where developers may want to locate property adjacent to a river or waterway, but 
development would conflict with maintaining the environmental benefits of the floodplain. 
Where there are diverging interests it is challenging for entities of various perspectives to 
recognize a medium.  
When diverse stakeholders engage in a joint venture, vested interests often come into play and 
can result in conflict and failure to agree on objectives, goals, and methods (Council 2011). No 
entity can be faulted for pursuing its own interests; however, problems develop when 
stakeholders view collaboration as a zero-sum game. Such problems can complicate resilience—
enhancing efforts and the development of effective collaboration (Council 2011).  
Prioritization 
Low prioritization of resilience—focused collaboration can frequently be the result of diverging 
interests. While planners and elected officials are often receptive to the importance of hazard 
mitigation and planning, natural hazard planning in communities is often held as a low priority 
on the political agenda (Burby 1998, Hamilton 2010). Communities are faced with struggling 
economies, unemployment, stressed education systems, endless costs associated with 
infrastructure maintenance, amongst many other challenging issues that affect community 
health and stability; these circumstances result in the tendency to view natural hazards as a 
secondary priority (Mileti 1999).  
Collaboration initiatives and partnerships revolving around hazard planning can be 
burdensome for policy makers because there are many other issues that are of higher necessity 
to the daily operations on the community. Often, these circumstances can result in conflicting 
priorities and a lack of coordination in engaging decision makers about hazard mitigation and 
community resilience (Hamilton 2010).  
Power and Trust among Collaborators 
There is an overall lack of trust among parties that collaborate to build resilience. Power 
imbalances among collaborating partners can be a key source of mistrust in collaborative 
environments (Bryson et al. 2006). Businesses fear government regulation, direction, or control 
that will limit creativity and market flexibility. There is a wide cultural gap between private 
sector managers and public sector officials. Their organizational cultures, standards, and 
languages are different, and thus make it difficult to enable or participate effectively in public 
and private partnerships (Council 2011). These power and trust imbalances become most 
significant when partners have difficulty agreeing on a shared purpose (Bryson et al. 2006).  
Information Sharing  
Incomplete or ineffective sharing of information, concerning threats and vulnerabilities, 
constitutes a challenge to public and private collaboration. Both government and the private 
sector have legitimate concerns regarding the sharing of information. The private sector’s 
concerns include the sensitivity of information, legal limits on information disclosure, 
advantages that competitors might gain through sharing, and non—disclosure agreements 
(Council 2011). The public sector may also have information privacy restrictions, transparency 
requirements and security rules as governments are required to protect classified information 
(Council 2011). Due to information sharing limitations it may create doubt about the 
effectiveness of such cross sector collaborative efforts.  
Engagement Disincentives 
Collaboration and partnerships are often formed through the efforts of individuals who venture 
outside of their organization to further collaborative engagement. However, organizations often 
do not seek, develop, or reward the organizational and individual competences needed to 
support collaborative efforts (Council 2011). When public sector entities interact with the 
private sector, the interactions often center on legal and regulatory issues, as opposed to 
voluntary and mutually beneficial collaboration (Council 2011). As a result of this, entities tend 
to function in silos rather than seek engagement.  
Regulatory Framework 
Vertical networking between local, regional and national collaborators can be very difficult for 
lower—level entities because each of the players collaborate at difference scales and are not 
effectively linked to one another (Council 2011). The complicated regulatory framework may 
result in some businesses or quasi—public/not—for—profit organizations collaborating with 
national entities; however, not participating with local—level entities within the community 
where they have a physical presence. While, other private or quasi—public entities may be very 
active locally but are not part of the regional or national collaborative efforts coordinated by 
federal partners (Council 2011). 
Uncertainty of Resilience—Focused Cross—Sector 
Collaboration in County Planning 
Even though the literature provides reasoning for why cross sector collaboration is important 
and insight into the barriers associated with collaboration, there is minimal local—level research 
regarding cross—sector collaboration (MacManus and Caruson 2011). There is opportunity to 
improve our understanding of existing cross—sector collaboration and its limits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3: Research Methods 
Research Question 
Considering the importance placed on resilience—focused cross sector collaboration, it is 
imperative to understand the various forms of collaboration that are taking place across 
communities. If the literature is correct in framing the importance of resilience—focused cross 
sector collaboration in past hazard events, sustained mitigation efforts can be considered an 
important factor towards achieving greater hazard resilience.   
While there is a mandate to update local HMPs every five years, in order to be eligible for 
hazard planning and recovery grant funding, there is little analysis of sustained cross—sector 
collaboration following the adoption of local HMPs and to what effect the collaboration is 
conducted.  
1. How extensive and what is the perceived quality of  public, quasi—public and private sector 
collaboration with regards to hazard planning following the adoption of county HMPs? 
2. What are the perceived barriers to cross—sector collaboration and why have these barriers 
emerged? 
3. What are the strategies or methods that have been most successful in supporting collaboration 
around natural hazards? 
The results to the first question will provide a general picture of the existing conditions 
regarding ongoing cross—sector collaboration in various counties across FEMA Region X. The 
results of this question not only capture how much ongoing collaboration is occurring and to 
what quality the collaboration is conducted, but will also identify the sectors counties are most 
likely to engage and with which sector collaboration is best conducted. If cross—sector 
collaboration is recognized as an integral element in hazard mitigation as argued by MacManus 
and Caruson (2011), the National Research Council (2011), Waugh and Streib (2006), and 
Schafer (2008), I would expect that cross—sector collaboration would be a fundamental element 
in planning. Finally the last question should identify strategies for overcoming the barriers to 
resilience—focused cross sector collaboration.  
Overview 
In order to answer the research questions, I conducted a cross—sectional survey of HMP 
steering committees to identify ongoing resilience—focused cross—sector collaboration. 
Steering committees are knowledgeable and experienced in hazard planning, and are often 
representative of public, quasi—public and private sectors.  
The steering committees were selected from counties in Alaska, Idaho, Oregon and Washington, 
all of which are within FEMA Region X and are of comparable size, so as to limit internal and 
external variability in natural, political and economic environments. I selected FEMA Region X 
counties because according to Brett Holt, FEMA Hazard Mitigation Planner, there is limited 
capacity at the federal level to conduct analysis of ongoing collaboration subsequent to the 
approval of the local HMP (Holt, Personal Communication, 2012).  
Like many counties across the country, counties within FEMA Region X function as an 
administrative resource and have played a significant role in hazard planning and emergency 
management. Many of the state's smaller municipalities have relied upon their county for 
disaster—related planning and provides the rationale in surveying county level entities 
(MacManus and Caruson 2011).  
Following the completion of the cross—sectional survey, I conducted case—interviews with 
County Emergency Managers whose HMP steering committees participated in the survey. 
During these interviews, we were able to discuss the survey responses and enhance the overall 
analysis of existing conditions surrounding resilience—focused collaboration.  
This analysis was carried out in three steps; (1) the creation and distribution of the electronic 
survey, (2) holding case—interviews, and (3) conducting a content analysis based on the survey 
and case—interview responses.  
Sample 
My sample consisted of 17 counties; one in Alaska, 3 in Idaho, 6 in Oregon and 7 in Washington. 
This distribution was based on county population. To control for vastly different planning 
contexts between large and small counties, only medium sized counties were selected. Selected 
counties had populations ranging from roughly 138,000 to 529,000 people, due to a natural 
break in county populations on both the high and low ends of that range.  Population data for 
each county came from the 2010 U.S. Census. Counties also had to have a FEMA approved 
HMP and a steering committee during the formulation of the plan.  
Procedures: Cross Sectional Survey 
The survey was electronically distributed, via Qualtrics software, to the local Emergency 
Manager or Hazard Mitigation Plan (HMP) Steering Committee Convener, whichever was 
applicable. The Emergency Manager or Committee Convener subsequently distributed the 
electronic survey, via email, to the HMP steering committee within each of the selected 
counties. If there had been staff turnover since the adoption of the local HMP, the Emergency 
Manager and/or Steering Committee Convener were instructed to distribute the survey to the 
person who is currently responsible for those tasks.  
In addition to the initial survey distribution, an electronic reminder was distributed by Josh 
Bruce, Interim Director of Oregon Partnership for Disaster Resilience, to the selected counties 
two weeks after the primary invitation.  
The survey was collected in the spring of 2012 and asked a series of seven questions about the 
overall extensiveness and perceived quality of public, quasi—public and private collaboration; 
and the responses will help determine barriers and strategies for sustaining resilience—focused 
collaborative efforts.  
Introductory Questions 
The survey respondents were asked three general filter questions, Question #1, to identify the 
County they were responding for; Question #2, identify the sector they represent (public, 
quasi—public or private); and Question #3, identify the entity responsible for leading hazard 
mitigation in their county. Asking these initial questions helps to identify survey response bias.  
Evaluating the Extensiveness and Quality of Cross Sector Collaboration 
Following the three initial questions, respondents were asked Question #4, to rate the extent and 
quality of ongoing hazard mitigation collaboration with Federal, State, Local, quasi—
public/not—for—profit and private sectors, since the adoption of the County HMP. On a scale 
of 0-4, with 0 having never collaborated and 4 having collaborated on a regular basis, the 
respondent was to identify how much collaboration they have participated in with the above 
mentioned entities. If the respondent identified that a partnership was in place, the 
representative was asked to then rate the collaborative quality as poor, fair, satisfactory or 
excellent. 
To gain a sense for the general collaborative nature of the County, Question #5, asks the 
respondent to compare levels of engagement of resilience-focused collaboration to other County 
level management activities.  
Evaluating Barriers to Cross Sector Collaboration 
The survey then analyzed the perceived planning barriers to cross—sector collaboration by 
asking the respondent in Question #6, to identify two primary barriers of ongoing Public, 
quasi—public/not—for—profit and private sector collaboration. If the respondent identified 
barriers to ongoing collaboration with public, quasi—public/not—for—profit and/or private 
entities, Question #7, asks them to explain strategies or methods that have been most successful 
in supporting collaboration around natural hazards.  
Cross—Sectional Survey Analysis 
The survey sample and response rate are estimated based upon the maximum number of 
entities and individuals identified in the HMP steering committee. Approximately 190 steering 
committees representatives were distributed the survey.1   
The survey analysis is broken down by general topic area: extent, quality, limiting factors and 
implementation strategies of cross—sector collaboration. Simple descriptive statistics were used 
to evaluate the survey responses.  
Procedures: Case—Interviews  
In developing a sense of the existing conditions surrounding resilience-focused cross—sector 
collaboration throughout FEMA Region X, case—interviews were conducted with communities 
that participated in the survey. Through the case—interviews I sought to gain a better 
understanding of the barriers associated with sustaining resilience—focused cross—sector 
collaboration, and clarify some of the themes identified by the steering committee survey. 
All of the seven communities that responded to the survey were invited to participate in a 
case—interview, three counties responded to the request, while four did not. Ultimately three 
case—interviews were performed with County Emergency Managers, Mike Curry from Jackson 
County, Oregon, Jay Wilson from Clackamas County, Oregon and Gerry Bozarth from Spokane 
County, Washington. Emergency Managers were selected for the case—interviews based upon 
the survey responses, documented in the Chapter 4: Results. The case—interviews were 
conducted over the phone and lasted approximately 20-30 minutes per interview.   
Limitations 
Several aspects of this study limited its ability to be conclusive, or more than a source of 
guidance for FEMA Region X and County Emergency Managers.  
 Consultation with FEMA Region X Hazard Mitigation Planner, Bret Holt, revealed that 
there may be variability regarding how frequently steering committees convene 
following the HMP adoption (Holt, Personal Communication, 2012). It is possible some 
steering committees have not convened since the last HMP update. This reality makes it 
challenging if not impossible for the Emergency Manager or Convener to forward the 
survey to committee members, resulting in a low survey response rate.  
 Second, due to the low response rate, the survey responses may not be representative of 
the larger population. Considering this analysis was a voluntary effort, it likely resulted 
in selective responses.  
 Third, I have limited information about the survey population. In terms of the survey 
sample, it is impossible to identify the survey sample size and estimate response rate, 
                                                     
1 This number is based upon the number of committee representatives documented in the local HMP.  
considering I did not directly distribute the survey to the HMP steering committees. Nor 
do I have any information regarding the cross—sector representation of the committee. 
 Finally, I was only able to contact a limited number of case—interviews with County 
Emergency Managers and therefore the views from these individuals may not be 
representative of all managers across FEMA Region X.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4: Results 
Approximately 190 steering committees representatives received the survey and 28 individuals 
responded. The response rate is estimated at 14%.  Overall, the survey captured steering 
committee responses from seven counties including Canyon County in Idaho, Clackamas, 
Jackson and Washington Counties in Oregon and Spokane, Thurston and Yakima Counties in 
Washington. Of the respondents, 96% of them represented public entities (27 respondents) and 
4% represented quasi—public/not—for—profit entities (1 respondent). There were no survey 
responses from the private sector.  
County Emergency Management Departments are 
identified as the primary responsible entity for 
resilience—focused collaborative efforts (75% 
response), followed by regional planning bodies (11% 
response) and then County Planning Departments 
(11% response).  The results of this question identified 
those in which to target for case—interviews, as they 
should have the most knowledge regarding resilience 
collaboration in the county. 
Extent of Cross-Sector Collaboration 
Resilience—focused collaboration is more common 
with local entities, including neighboring cities, 
counties, public health agencies, etc. In contrast, collaboration is rare with federal, state, quasi—
public/not—for—profit and private entities.  
According to Gerry Bozarth, the Spokane County Emergency Manager, it is common to see 
varying levels of collaboration with respect to higher and lower levels of government due to 
bureaucratic systems. He explained that the role of the state and federal government may not 
have direct involvement with local—level partners in ongoing collaboration, because their role 
is to support the planning process as a whole. Higher—level government tends to facilitate 
collaboration through grant allocation, training and other support services (Bozarth, Personal 
Communication, 2012).  
When comparing general extent of collaboration on a scale of do not collaborate—to—collaborate 
on a regular basis, 20%of the individual responses indicate that they frequently collaborate with 
federal, state, local, quasi—public/not—for—profit or private sectors, 34% of the responses 
identify that they sometimes collaborate, and 23% indicate that they rarely collaborate in terms of 
hazard mitigation. The majority of responses (72%) indicate a collaborative extent of sometimes 
or less with any of the entities. Only 27% of the responses consider collaborative extent to be 
frequent or more often. Survey results are displayed in Table 2, the most commonly reported 
level of extent is bolded.   
Table 1: County Survey Responses
County Number of Respondents
Canyon 1
Clackamas 8
Jackson 6
Washington 1
Spokane 1
Thurston 8
Yakima 2
Unknown 1
Total 28
*The 28th survey response did not identify the county 
they were responding for. 
 The survey also measured the extent of resilience-focused cross—sector collaboration by 
comparing levels of engagement to other county level management initiatives, such as business 
development, parks and open-space planning, and health and human services, etc. Compared 
to other County activities, public, quasi—public/not-for—profit and the private sectors are less 
engaged in hazard mitigation and resilience—
focused collaborative efforts than other planning 
initiatives (36% of responses). This response leads 
to the assumption that hazard mitigation is not 
held as a high priority on the county planning 
agenda, especially in comparison to other 
mandated planning initiatives or the pressing 
need for acquired grants. 
According to the survey and case—interviews 
collaborative variability, in terms of which 
entities collaborate with and how frequently, is 
the result of many circumstances that influence cross-sector engagement in communities. These 
issues are addressed in Limiting Factors within Chapter 4: Results. 
Quality of Cross—Sector Collaboration 
In general, there is better resilience—focused collaboration quality with local jurisdictions in 
FEMA Region X counties, than with federal, state, quasi—public/not—for—profit and private 
partners. All but the local entities, which were given a satisfactory quality, were considered to 
have fair collaboration quality. If a collaborative partnership was not present for a given entity, 
Response
Percent of 
Responses
Much Less 5 18%
Less 10 36%
About the Same 9 32%
More 2 7%
Much More 2 7%
Total 28 100%
Table 3: Cross-Sector Engagement in Hazard 
Mitigation Planning in Comparison to Other 
County Planning Initiatives
Federal (FEMA, Army Corps, etc.) 4 8 8 4 2 2.69
State (State Emergency Management, 
National Guard, etc.)
1 11 7 6 1 2.81
Local (Neighboring Cities or Counties, 
Public Health Agencies, Educational 
Services, etc.)
1 3 8 10 5 3.56
Quasi-Public/Not-for-Profit (Resource 
Management Districts, Special 
Puspore Districts, etc.)
4 5 11 5 1 2.77
Private (Utilities, Finance and 
Insurance, Manufacturing, 
Information, etc.)
10 4 11 2 0 2.19
Total Responses 20 31 45 27 9
Pecentage of Total Responses 15% 23% 34% 20% 7%
*The remaining 1% is due to a respondent not answering this question. 
Table 2: Extent of Collaboration
Do not 
Collaborate
Rarely 
Collaborate
Sometimes 
Collaborate
Frequently 
Collaborate
Collaborate 
on a Regular 
Basis
Mean
respondents rated quality as not applicable, and the rating was omitted from calculating the 
mean score and percent of response. When comparing general quality of collaboration, on a 
scale from poor –to—excellent, 71% of the individual responses denote that the cross—sector 
collaboration that is occurring within their county is of satisfactory quality or better. 
Quality of collaboration is also influenced by a variety of community factors, including 
resources, education, collaborative framework, prioritization and regulatory framework. 
According to County Emergency Managers, those limiting factors are the same as those 
identified as influencing collaboration extent. Details clarifying each of the influencing factors 
are discussed in Limiting Factors of Chapter 4: Results.  
  
Comparing Extent and Quality of Collaboration 
In comparing extent to quality between federal, state, local, quasi—public/not—for—profit and 
private sectors, an assumption can be made that extent and frequency of collaboration influence 
quality of collaboration. Groups that were rated with less frequent collaboration were given a 
lower quality rating, and the local jurisdictions that were rated with a higher extent were also 
given a higher quality rating. These results are listed in Table 5 below.  
Table 4: Quality of Collaboration
Not Applicable Poor Fair Satisfactory Excellent Mean
Federal (FEMA, Army Corps, etc.) 6 2 4 8 2 2.63
State (State Emergency Management, National 
Guard, etc.)
4 2 2 11 3 2.83
Local (Neighboring Cities or Counties, Public 
Health Agencies, Educational Services, etc.)
3 0 3 10 7 3.20
Quasi-Public/Not-for-Profit (Resource 
Management Districts, Special Puspore 
Districts, etc.)
4 0 5 12 1 2.78
Private (Utilities, Finance and Insurance, 
Manufacturing, Information, etc.)
8 1 6 7 0 2.64
Total Responses 5 20 48 13
Total Pertage of Responses 6% 23% 56% 15%
 Limiting Factors of Cross-Sector Collaboration 
Limiting Factors by Sector 
The limiting factors of extent and quality of cross—sector collaboration identified by the 
steering committees emerged as five general themes including, resources, education, 
collaborative framework, prioritization and regulatory framework. While some of the themes 
are uniform across the various sectors, others have particular nuances unique to an individual 
sector.  
General Observations: 
 Resources, education, and regulatory framework are three themes where responses were 
uniform across the public, quasi—public and private sectors. Within the themes, each of 
the sectors identified staff, time and funding; lack of hazards knowledge and awareness 
of risk; and an unwillingness or aversion to following the regulatory guidelines.   
 The theme of collaborative framework has slight nuances across the sectors. The quasi—
public and private sector identify additional limitations to collaboration that were not 
identified specifically for the public sector, those include, knowing which groups to 
participate in, lack of experience in collaborating, and willingness to form partnerships. 
 Within the theme of prioritization also emerge slight nuances across the sectors. In 
particular this sector is concerned with “what is on the table” for them. This nuance, 
does not present itself for either the public or quasi—public sectors. 
Table 5: Comparison of Collaboration Extent and Quality per Sector
Collaboration 
Extent
Collaboration 
Quality
Federal (FEMA, Army Corps, etc.) Rare Fair
State (State Emergency Management, 
National Guard, etc.)
Rare Fair
Local (Neighboring Cities or Counties, 
Public Health Agencies, Educational 
Services, etc.)
Sometimes Satisfactory
Quasi-Public/Not-for-Profit (Resource 
Management Districts, Special Puspore 
Districts, etc.)
Rare Fair
Private (Utilities, Finance and Insurance, 
Manufacturing, Information, etc.)
Rare Fair
Table 6 highlights the most 
frequently reported limiting 
factors per sector, based on 
the survey responses. Even 
though resources are 
identified as a limiting factor 
across the sectors, it is the second most commonly reported limiting factor for the private sector. 
These results tie back to the nuances addressed above. The steering committees consider the 
private sector to be more concerned with prioritization, and in particular, the costs versus the 
benefits of collaborating than are the public or quasi—public sectors. When the benefits of 
mitigation are not immediate, it influences the willingness of the private sector to collaborate.  
Another important consideration in terms of these results, places emphasis on the collaborative 
framework utilized to engage the quasi—public/not—for—profit sector in hazard planning. 
While this limiting factor was identified across all sectors, it carries more weight regarding the 
quasi—public/not—for—profit sector. Therefore it is recognized by the steering committees 
that the County’s inability to identify stakeholders, execute an effective outreach strategy, and 
provide opportunities for interaction is a significant factor in determining the extent and quality 
of collaboration with quasi—public/not—for—profit entities.  
Reference Table 7 for general limiting factors by sector and theme, the results are not listed in 
priority.  
Table 6: Most Frequently Reported Limiting Factor
Primary Secondary
Public Resources Prioritization
Quasi-Public/Not-for-Profit Resources Collaborative Framework
Private Prioritization Resources
 Common Limiting Factors  
The limiting factors commonly identified by the steering committee and Emergency Managers 
include; resources, education and prioritization. Each of these factors is recognized as 
influencing resilience—focused cross sector collaboration across the public, quasi—public and 
private sectors.  
Table 7: Limiting Factors of Cross-Sector Collaboration
Resources Education Collaborative Framework Prioritization Regulatory Framework
▪Lack of Funding
▪Lack of Education
▪Lack of Staff Time ▪Aversion to Regulations
▪Lack of Communication
▪Planning Defficiencies
▪Unmatched Objectives
Resources Education Collaborative Framework Prioritization Regulatory Framework
▪Lack of Funding
▪Lack of Education ▪Planning Defficiencies
▪Lack of Staff Time ▪Lack of Communication
▪Unmatched Objectives
▪No Immediate Benefit
Resources Education Collaborative Framework Prioritization Regulatory Framework
▪Lack of Funding ▪Aversion to Regulations
▪No Legal Requirement
▪Lack of Education ▪Planning Defficiencies
▪Lack of Staff Time ▪Lack of Communication
▪Unmatched Objectives
▪No Immediate Benefit
▪Lack of Demand
▪Cost v.s. Benefits
▪Lack of Common Goals
▪Ineffective Outreach 
Strategy
▪Limited Opportunities for 
Interaction
▪Lack of Experience 
Collaborating
▪Willingness to Form 
Partnerships
Public Sector
Quasi-Public/Not-for-Profit Sector
▪Awareness of 
Hazards and Risk
▪Inability to Identifiy 
Appropriate Stakeholders
▪Hazard Mitigation in not 
the Highest Priority for Day-
to-Day Needs
▪Different Federal, State 
and Local Regulatory 
Frameworks 
▪Indifference to Hazard 
Mitigation
▪Hazard Mitigation is not a 
Core Mission
▪Pressure by Development 
Sector
▪Lack of Available 
Staff
▪Lack of Available 
Staff
▪Lack of Subject-
Matter Expertise
▪Hazard Mitigation in not 
the Highest Priority for Day-
to-Day Needs
▪Unwilling to Follow 
Current Regulations
▪Indifference to Hazard 
Mitigation
▪Unconnected Realms of 
Operation
▪Awareness of 
Hazards and Risk
▪Awareness of 
Hazards and Risk
Private Sector
▪Inability to Identifiy 
Appropriate Stakeholders
▪Knowing which Work 
Groups to Participate In
▪Lack of 
Knowledge 
Surrounding 
▪Lack of Subject-
Matter Expertise
▪Lack of Available 
Staff
▪Inability to Identifiy 
Appropriate Stakeholders
▪Knowing which Work 
Groups to Participate In
▪Issues of Sharing 
Proprietary 
Information ▪Limited Opportunities for 
Interaction
▪Lack of Experience 
Collaborating
▪Willingness to Form 
Partnerships
▪Indifference to Hazard 
Mitigation
▪Hazard Mitigation in not 
the Highest Priority for Day-
to-Day Needs
▪Unconnected Realms of 
Operation
▪They Look Out For Their 
Best Interest
Resources 
Extent and quality of collaboration is first and foremost influenced by funding. Most 
resilience—focused collaboration efforts rely on the availability of grant funds, as grant funds 
decrease, so has participation(Curry, Personal Communication, 2012). Large or small, public or 
private—most entities across FEMA Region X have limited capacity to allocate time, staff and 
fund resilience—focused initiatives (Case-Interviews, Personal Communication, 2012). As is the 
case with the public sector, staff are likely required to wear multiple hats concerning their job 
responsibilities and only a limited portion of their time is dedicated to hazard mitigation 
(Wilson, Personal Communication, 2012).  
Education 
Education across the public, quasi—public/not—for—profit and private sectors is also an 
influencing factor of extent and quality of cross—sector collaboration. Sector entities have 
varying levels of knowledge surrounding hazard mitigation and awareness of hazards and 
risks. This knowledge not only varies across the sectors, but also within specific entities. The 
lack of education surrounding potential hazards influences the perspective importance of 
mitigation. It is also apparent these sectors may have a lack of awareness with regards to what 
mitigation activities are currently going on throughout the county and thus would affect their 
responses for extent and quality.  
Prioritization 
Hazard mitigation is not a priority amongst the day—to—day needs for many public, quasi—
public and private sector entities. Whether this is the result of limited funding or overwhelmed 
staff, these factors result in a general indifferent attitude towards hazard mitigation. This is 
particularly evident in Jackson County, where Mike Curry's ability to recruit members at large 
from the community has not been well attended. As it stands, the steering committee has 
limited cross—sector representation (Curry, Personal Communication 2012).  
This relative indifference to hazard mitigation may also be attributed to limited incentives that 
do not encourage participation. Private sector entities, in particular, may have lower levels of 
collaboration than public and quasi—public partners, largely in—part because they tend to 
weigh the costs versus benefits or participating. There must be something on the table to 
encourage cross—sector entities to engage; otherwise staffing, funding and time constraints 
may discourage their participation (Curry, Personal Communication, 2012).  
Varied Limiting Factors: Steering Committee 
However, some of the limiting factors addressed by the steering committee differed from the 
responses shared by County Emergency Manager's. While the responses were not specifically 
contradictory of each other, their perspective likely influenced the character of their responses. 
Regulatory Framework 
The federal, state and local governments involved with hazard mitigation have different 
established regulatory frameworks. Thus the complexity of the system can inhibit cross—sector 
involvement for partners who may be unfamiliar with the process or unwilling to decipher the 
requirements needed by the respective levels of government to effectively participate.  
For those entities who may not fully understand the regulatory framework, there is a common 
misconception that participating in hazard mitigation can lead to additional regulation. Thus 
there is a tendency for entities to have an aversion, or sense of distrust, of the regulations 
established by the varying levels of government. While this cannot be certain based upon the 
survey or case—interviews it is a plausible explanation for why there is varying cross—sector 
participation in resilience—focused collaborative efforts.  
Collaborative Framework 
It is apparent from the survey that steering committees consider the existing resilience—focused 
collaborative framework to be ineffective. Respondents indicate that planning, lack of 
communication, limited opportunities for engagement, and the inability to identify appropriate 
stakeholders that will benefit and supplement the collaborative process, are just some of the 
various limiting factors that influence extent and quality of collaboration.  
Varied Limiting Factors: Emergency Managers 
Geography 
According to the case—interviews, geography of the local county is a double—edged sword in 
terms of benefiting collaboration. On one hand expansive, rural geographic extent can lend 
itself towards increasing collaboration, due to necessity of limited resources; on the other it can 
hinder entities ability to participate in such efforts.  
Gerry Bozarth suggests rural counties may have stronger partnerships due to the systematic 
lack of resources.  Rural counties reflect a dispersed population, fewer jurisdictions, and less 
funding as compared to metropolitan areas. Specifically in Spokane County, the Department of 
Emergency Management incorporates all cities, towns and unincorporated areas under one 
agreement and management structure (Bozarth, Personal Communication, 2012). Considering 
the size of many communities across Spokane County, there is limited hazard mitigation 
planning resource capacity; therefore the County Emergency Manager and staff, act as the 
regional planning body. This program structure can alternatively strengthen the planning 
process—streamline resources, maintain regional oversight and coordinate initiatives—versus, 
the planning dynamic in more politically complex regions, where multiple individual 
emergency managers all coordinate and duplicate similar efforts.  
However, in Jackson County, the extreme variability in community size and the widely 
dispersed population present throughout the various remote cities obstructs collaboration. 
Many communities across the county have limited staff allocated to hazard planning and thus 
rely on the county to provide such resources. According to Mike Curry, the distance required 
for representatives to travel, in order to convene with a broader planning body, deters cross—
sector engagement for any type of mitigation initiative (Curry, Personal Communication, 2012). 
Risk Perception and Uncertainty 
Immediacy and urgency of a hazard and its associated risks plays an important role in 
determining extent and quality of collaboration; while this was not specifically supported by the 
survey responses, all of the case—interviews addressed this as an influencing factor of ongoing 
cross—sector collaboration. The County Emergency Managers argue that hazard mitigation 
may be less collaborative than other county level initiatives due in the infrequency of hazards, 
and if hazards do not serve as an immediate threat it is difficult to gain momentum (Bozarth, 
Personal Communication, 2012). Even though Oregon has a history of earthquakes and 
tsunamis, due to the long time—horizon of such hazards the perceived risk can be downplayed 
by the community.  
Organizational Cultures 
Whether rural or urban, organizational politics can interfere with efforts to initiate and sustain 
cross—sector collaboration. Resilience—enhancing efforts require the collaboration of diverse 
partnerships, some of which may have minimal experience working with one another, have 
divergent priorities, or operate differently in terms of language and communication. 
Communities and regions are influenced by an inherent competitive nature between players 
because of these differences, and competition can be amplified when there are multiple cities, 
towns and counties all vying for funds and recognition (Bozarth, Personal Communication, 
2012).  
 
 
 
 
Chapter 5: Recommendations & Conclusion 
Recommendations 
Despite the variety of challenges that counties face in sustaining resilience—focused cross—
sector collaboration, the steering committees, County Emergency Managers and the literature 
offered strategies for successfully implementing such efforts. The strategies listed below can be 
utilized by hazard mitigation planning practitioners throughout FEMA Region X. 
Establish a Collaborative Structure and Process  
Collaboration to achieve disaster resilience requires considerable attention to organizational 
design and structure. It is recommended that County Emergency Management Departments 
across FEMA Region X strengthen and/or reorganize the existing hazard mitigation program 
structure, including the collaborative framework used to engage cross—sector partnerships. 
Many of the factors that limit cross-sector collaboration identified by the steering committees 
addressed the inadequate collaborative structure currently in place across counties in FEMA 
Region X. A revitalized program has the potential to improve communication, disseminate 
information, strengthen diverse stakeholder representation, form relationships, and organize 
opportunities for partners to engage with one another—and overall improve extensiveness and 
quality of collaboration.  
The literature review, survey and case—interviews all emphasize the importance of 
coordinators, that ensure communities progress in collaboration, partnership building and other 
project goals (Council 2011, Case-Interviews, Personal Communication 2012, Survey 2012). The 
National Research Council, in particular, suggests that regardless of how collaborative activities 
are organized, it is necessary to devote resources specifically for collaboration management 
(Council 2011). It appears to be insufficient to argue for the importance of collaboration without 
investing in individuals or groups that are charged with the responsibility of ensuring that 
collaboration is taking place. When hazards are infrequent, it is far more challenging to gain 
ongoing active participation, thus a strong collaborative network with dedicated staff will help 
keep loss reduction and resilience a community priority as an integral part of normal 
community functioning (Council 2011).  
 An example of an ongoing collaborative program is Be Ready Utah. Be Ready Utah is the 
State of Utah's official emergency preparedness campaign managed by the Division of 
Homeland Security. It is designed as a bottom—up approach for preparedness with 
their primary focus on individual personal responsibility for preparedness. The Be Ready 
Utah campaign was officially launched in April 2005, following the devastating floods in 
January 2005. Be Ready Utah provides valuable information for individuals and families, 
communities, public safety professionals, business and civic leaders, school 
administrators and volunteers (Utah.gov).  
 
 Another example of a public—private collaborative is the Aware and Prepare Program in 
Santa Barbara, California. This is a public-private partnership dedicated to 
strengthening disaster resiliency. It enhances the capabilities and coordination of 
government agencies and non-profit organizations through public education and 
awareness, planning and training, as well as, the coordination of resources.  
 
One of the largest undertakings for the Aware and Prepare Program was enhancing the 
capabilities of nonprofit organizations in Santa Barbara County to prepare for disasters 
and collaborate with each other and with the government sector. The program has been 
able to provide resources to enhance their role in a disaster situation, and offers valuable 
guidance for practitioners in FEMA Region X for how to approach the quasi—
public/not—for—profit sector in collaboration.  
Develop Alternative Funding Streams 
FEMA Region X reliance on federal grants is not providing adequate resources to sustain 
planning initiatives, and may be the primary reason for limited cross-sector collaboration. 
Limited funding affects staff allocation, and time dedicated to hazard mitigation and emergency 
management. As noted from the literature, steering committee survey and the case-interviews, 
dedicated and motivated staff in charge of hazard mitigation planning is critical to the success 
of the program and implementation strategies. In order for counties to have the capacity to fund 
permanent staff and ongoing collaboration efforts, it is recommended County Emergency 
Management Departments seek alternative funding streams to provide support for planning 
and outreach. 
 An example of an alternative funding stream is the interlocal agreement enacted in 
Spokane County. The interlocal agreement charges a per capita rate, for all cities, towns 
and unincorporated areas over 1,000 persons, to fund the County Emergency 
Management Department. This alternative funding stream allocates enough resources 
for an emergency planning staff of eight. While Gerry Bozarth acknowledges that this is 
a rare approach to funding emergency planning and hazard mitigation, it has been 
successful in Spokane County (Bozarth, Personal Communication, 2012).  
 
 Another progressive venture for alternative funding is to seek out foundations that have 
some investment in hazard resilience. An example of innovative funding is provided by 
the Aware and Prepare Program in Santa Barbara, California. Over 40 projects and 
programs have been supported directly by Aware & Prepare, totaling an investment of 
over $5—million since 2008. Since its inception, Aware & Prepare has been supported by a 
collaborative of funders including the Orfalea Foundation, the Santa Barbara 
Foundation, James S. Bower Foundation, Wood-Claeyssens Foundation, Outhwaite 
Charitable Trust, Hotchkis Family Foundation and the Fund for Santa Barbara 
(Foundation).   
Take Advantage of the Hazard Opportunity Window 
The key to communicating and engaging the broader public about hazard resilience is to utilize 
windows of opportunity during and/or after a disaster. The force of one catastrophic event has 
the potential to change what people think, their behavior, and even public policy oriented 
towards reducing hazard risk (USDA 2004).  This concept also applies to disasters abroad, such 
as earthquake and tsunamis that create an opportunity to raise the issues of community 
resilience locally.  
Disasters can create new conditions and relationships within environmental and political 
structures, institutions and organizations (Birkmann et al. 2010). Windows of opportunity 
enable and excite institutions that once were not previously engaged, to become involved in the 
issues of hazard planning and mitigation. These dynamics reframe how hazards are managed 
and provide teachable moments where people and agencies see it as critical to reduce future 
losses (Birkmann et al. 2010). For further explanation of disaster impacts on community systems 
and change, reference Birkmann 2008. 
In some regions, natural hazards occur infrequently thus it is essential that programs and 
strategies for outreach during the hazard opportunity window are considered throughout the 
existing hazard mitigation program. Such that in the event of a flood, for example, communities 
have a developed strategy for implementing impromptu community hearings to account for 
public feedback regarding flooding impacts; and/or the community has a strategy and process 
identified for the dissemination of public awareness campaigns, that account for special 
population characteristics; i.e., language, disability, age, etc.. Prior planning in terms of public 
engagement will benefit the quality and success of outreach strategies.  
Maximize Hazard Planning Efforts through Multi—Objective 
Planning 
Multi—objective planning and management creates support for hazard mitigation by 
expanding current planning initiatives to include mitigation concepts, policies and activities.  
Integrating mitigation concepts and policies into existing plans, such as the Comprehensive 
Plan, Capital Improvement Plan, Stormwater Master Plan, Redevelopment Housing Plans, etc., 
provides expanded means for implementing initiatives via well—established mechanisms 
(FEMA 2002). For example not all communities have comprehensive plans or are required to 
develop them under state legislation, but in some sense all communities need to plan for their 
future. As the comprehensive plans are reviewed and updated, mitigation policies and action 
items should be incorporated into planning elements such as economic development, 
transportation, housing, and environmental protection (FEMA 2002). Reference the FEMA State 
and Local Mitigation Planning How—to—Guide for implementation ideas.  
Examples of multi—objective planning include: 
 Redevelopment and housing plans: these plans identify areas where construction is 
occurring or will occur. Opportunities exist to incorporate mitigation techniques into 
retrofit activities and new construction, and to influence the location of redevelopment 
away from hazard areas;  
 Open space and recreation plans: these plans target locations for open space and 
recreation areas where property acquisition or buyout programs in hazard areas can 
complement the planned improvements; 
 Transportation Plans: these plans identify and prioritize road improvement projects 
where mitigation where mitigation of transportation and utility systems can be 
incorporated.  
Depart from the Command—and—Control Management 
Structure 
Traditional hazard and emergency management originates from a command—and—control 
structure that is intrinsically top—down.  The top—down management framework can 
influence both the flow of communication and the collaborative nature of decision—making. A 
truly collaborative approach to hazard resilience necessitates an inherently motivated convener 
that pursues outreach and the constant facilitation of feedback—loops. This study revealed the 
need for Region X counties to reevaluate the fundamental principles of their management 
structure.  
This recommendation is the direct result of the steering committee survey responses that 
critique the collaborative framework currently operationalized in FEMA Region X counties. 
Issues of collaboration including, i.e. identification of stakeholders, communication, 
opportunities for engagement, etc., were only addressed by the steering committee 
representatives. Because of this, it is recommended counties establish a process to facilitate two-
way communication between the steering committee and Emergency Management Department 
on an ongoing basis. This approach is characteristically divergent from the traditional 
command—and—control approach of hazard management where information most commonly 
flows in one direction, i.e. from the Emergency Manager. It needs to be possible for the steering 
committee representatives, as well as, quasi—public and private partners in the broader 
community to communicate what they think works, and does not work, concerning the 
collaborative framework established by the county. As well as, facilitate a forum that establishes 
a platform for cross—sector partners to share current activities they are implementing to 
improve resilience.   
It is critical to note, that the collaborative and engaging nature of hazard mitigation is largely 
the result of the personal traits embodied by the Emergency Manager. The Emergency 
Management attitude and ability to be receptive and actively implement feedback—influences 
their management capacity to increase cross-sector collaboration.   
The facilitation of communication can be improved by a variety of strategies: 
 establish workshops that engage cross—sector partners in discussion and planning;  
 distribute informational surveys; 
 meet one—on—one with cross—sector representatives, as it may prove beneficial to 
approach them in contrast to them coming to the county;   
 include the facilitation of cross—sector communication as a job description of an existing 
employee, so that someone is held accountable; and/or 
 hire a non—biased contractor to stabilize the process, someone that is removed from 
existing relationship dynamics in the community.   
Conclusion 
This study analyzed cross—sector collaboration based on perceptions of county steering 
committees and Emergency Managers. Through this study I was able to assess the extent, 
quality and existing issues surrounding cross—sector collaboration in FEMA Region X counties; 
and while this study is only exploratory, some high—level guidance can be provided to FEMA 
Region X and Emergency Managers on how to improve cross-sector collaboration.  
This initial attempt of analyzing cross—sector collaboration opens several possibilities for 
future research. The following is a list of potential research topics that would enhance this 
introductory study on cross—sector collaboration.  
Suggestions for future research 
1. Research successful resilience-focused collaborative program structures and processes 
such as those represented by Be Ready Utah and Aware and Prepare, of Santa Barbara 
California; and identify what resilience—focused collaborative structures are feasible 
for FEMA Region X.  
2. Research alternative funding strategies for hazard planning and implementation to 
supplement the existing funding structure. It may be critical to pay special attention to 
how the structure originated in evaluating the success of the strategy.  
3. Develop policy recommendations for the formulation of a national public—private 
collaborative framework, by evaluating other existing national frameworks that are 
currently in place. 
4. Conduct an economic analysis of the benefits of multi—objective planning, and 
quantify the reduction of duplication of efforts through this planning approach.  
5. Further research Emergency Management Department incentive strategies to 
encourage broader extent of collaboration with quasi—public /not—for-profit and 
private entities. 
6. In evaluating extent and quality of cross-sector collaboration in future research, 
capture insight from the private sector. The approach taken to survey steering 
committees was ineffective at collecting private sector input. In targeting the private 
sector, consider surveying a chamber of commerce or another community group that 
is primarily composed of private sector entities.  
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